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Joint Task Switching 2
Abstract
Two different variations of joint task switching led to different conclusions as to whether co-
acting individuals share the same task-sets. The present study aimed at bridging this gap by 
replicating the version in which two actors performed two different tasks. Experiment 1 
showed switch costs across two actors in a joint condition, which agreed with previous 
studies, but also yielded even larger switch costs in a solo condition, which contradicted the 
claim that actors represent an alternative task as their own when it is carried out by the co-
actor but not when no one carries it out. Experiments 2 and 3 further examined switch costs 
in the solo condition with the aim to rule out possible influences of task instructions for and 
experiences with the other task that was not assigned to the actor. Before participants were 
instructed on the second of the two tasks, switch costs were still obtained without a co-actor 
when explicit task names (“COLOUR” and “SHAPE”) served as go/nogo signals 
(Experiment 2), but not when arbitrary symbols (“XXXX” and “++++”) served as go/nogo 
signals (Experiment 3). The results thus imply that switch costs depend on participants’ 
knowledge of task cues being assigned to two different tasks, but not on whether the other 
task is performed by a co-actor. These findings undermine the assumption that switch costs in 
the joint conditions reflect shared task-sets between co-actors in this procedure. 
Keywords: Task sharing; joint task switching; co-representation; joint cognition. 
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Joint Task Switching 3
Numerous models and theories have been suggested to account for human performance 
in isolation but only little is known about how individuals perceive and act in the presence of, 
or in interaction with, other individuals (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). This lack of knowledge 
has, among other things, motivated studies in which individual performance in classical 
experimental tasks is compared with performance in conditions where the task is shared with 
a co-actor. The studied tasks comprised of the Simon task (e.g., Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 
2003; Yamaguchi, Wall, & Hommel, 2018), flanker tasks (e.g., Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2011; Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2014) and task-switching designs (Dudarev & 
Hassin, 2016; Liefooghe, 2016; Yamaguchi, Wall, & Hommel, 2017b), on which our present 
study focused—the key question being how much an actor represents of his or her co-actor’s 
task (Wenke et al., 2011; Yamaguchi et al., 2017b).
When performed in isolation, a typical task switching procedure consists of two 
different tasks (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2000), and a robust finding is that responses are faster 
when the current trial requires the same task as the immediately preceding trial (task repeat 
trial) than when it requires switching to a different task (task switch trial). The difference in 
response time (RT) between these types of trials is called task-switch costs (TSCs), or simply 
switch costs. Although robust, TSCs can be abolished when the preceding trial is a nogo trial, 
which is mainly because the advantage of repeating the same task disappears when a response 
is withheld on the preceding trial (Schuch & Koch, 2003). 
Our previous studies used a joint version of this go/nogo procedure with pairs of actors 
sharing the tasks (Yamaguchi et al., 2017b): each actor was assigned the same set of two 
tasks, but each trial required only one of the actors to make a response (a go trial) whereas the 
other actor had to withhold responding (a nogo trial). The results showed TSCs when the 
preceding trial was performed by the same actor as the actor on the current trial (i.e., after a 
go trial), but they were abolished when the preceding trial was performed by a different actor 
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Joint Task Switching 4
than the current actor (after a nogo trial). The outcomes were comparable to those in a solo 
condition in which the actors performed a go/nogo procedure without a co-actor (Schuch & 
Koch, 2003). These results were replicated in subsequent studies (Yamaguchi et al., 2017a, 
2019), and suggest that actors do not represent the task of their co-actor.
The exact opposite conclusion was drawn by Dudarev and Hassin (2016), who had 
participants switch between a parity and a magnitude task. In a full-task condition, 
participants were presented with a task cue that indicated which task they were to perform 
and, 900 ms later, with a stimulus that required a left-right keypress judgment regarding its 
parity or magnitude. In a solo condition, they carried out only one of the two tasks but did 
nothing on trials where the task cue indicated the other task. In a joint condition, they did the 
same but here the other task was carried out by a co-actor. The important feature of Dudarev 
and Hassin’s procedure was that each actor was assigned a single task that differed from their 
co-actor’s task, whereas each actor was assigned the same set of two tasks in our previous 
joint task switching (Yamaguchi et al., 2017b). In Dudarev and Hassin’s procedure, TSCs 
were obtained in the full-task condition and in the joint condition, but not in the solo 
condition. Note that this finding of TSCs in the solo condition appears inconsistent with 
findings in many previous studies, in which TSCs were abolished after nogo trials (e.g., 
Lenartowiez, Yeung, & Cohen, 2011; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Verbruggen, Liefooghe, 
Szmalec, & Vandierenconck, 2005), but Dudarev and Hassin’s procedure differed from those 
used in the previous studies: given that each participant performed only one of the two tasks, 
trials following nogo trials were always switch trials. 
Dudarev and Hassin’s second experiment generated a “task-switching benefit” in the 
solo condition, a TSC in a replication of the joint condition. Importantly, in their third 
condition in which two actors carried out the same task, they found no effect, based on which 
the authors concluded that the effect found in their joint condition was not due to switching 
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Joint Task Switching 5
between actors. Instead, the authors concluded that “people track others’ tasks and mentally 
do it with them, even when doing it engages effortful and costly executive functions” (p. 
227). In other words, the actors co-represented their co-actor’s task and performed it 
mentally as if it were their own task (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006). If their conjecture is correct, 
Dudarev and Hassin’s procedure could be a viable method to investigate task sharing 
between co-actors.
Interestingly, Liefooghe (2016) conducted a very similar study to Dudarev and Hassin’s 
(2016) study but with somewhat different outcomes. He had participants switch between 
color and shape judgments of visual stimuli, as indicated by a task cue that preceded the 
stimuli by either 100 or 1000 ms. He also compared a full-task condition with solo and joint 
conditions, both of which required each actor to perform only one of the two tasks. The full-
task condition again generated the largest TSC, which was about three times larger than the 
TSC in the joint condition. With the long cue-stimulus interval, the joint condition produced 
significant TSCs whereas the solo condition did not, which replicated Dudarev and Hassin 
(2016). With the short interval, however, significant TSCs were obtained in all three 
conditions, and TSCs in the joint and solo conditions were no longer different. Liefooghe 
(2016) concluded that participants in the joint condition “do not seem to make a 
representation of the co-actor’s task-set” (p. 72), and he considered that the remaining 
differences between the joint and solo conditions might be because the presence of the co-
actor and/or of his/her activities impairs the retrieval of the actors own task rules and/or 
makes actor discrimination (which in these conditions is confounded with task 
discrimination) more difficult. Moreover, Liefooghe suggested that his use of peripheral left 
and right stimuli to spatially cue a task (and an actor) might have distracted participants in the 
no-go trials of the solo condition, where the cues actually drew attention away from the 
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Joint Task Switching 6
events belonging to the other task. Less peripheral cues, he speculated, might have created 
better comparability between the joint and solo conditions.
Taken altogether, the available evidence from Dudarev and Hassin’s (2016) and 
Liefooghe’s (2016) studies shows that TSCs can be obtained in the joint condition of their 
procedure, unlike the joint condition of our previous studies (Yamaguchi et al., 2017a, 2017b, 
2019), and such a finding suggests that the presence of another person might indeed have an 
impact on task-switching performance of individuals. However, it remains unclear whether 
this impact really implies co-representation of tasks as suggested by Dudarev and Hassin, and 
whether and to what degree it challenges our previous conclusion that actors do not represent 
their co-actor’s task set. Following Liefooghe, we considered the possibility that the critical 
difference between the joint and solo conditions, which led Dudarev and Hassin (2016) to 
argue for co-representation, might be due to differences in the attentional demands of these 
two conditions—differences that can account for the outcomes without referring to dedicated 
“social mechanisms.” We tested this possibility by partially replicating the basic experimental 
setup of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016), except that we (a) focused on the 
theoretically relevant joint and solo conditions; (b) replaced Liefooghe’s potentially 
problematic peripheral task cues by central task cues; and (c) reduced display complexity as 
compared to Liefooghe by not presenting the stimulus-response mapping on the screen. 
According to Dudarev and Hassin’s (2016) account, one would expect TSCs to be restricted 
to the joint condition, whereas Liefooghe’s interpretation suggests that both conditions might 
generate TSCs.
EXPERIMENT 1
The present experiment attempted to replicate the main findings of Dudarev and 
Hassin’s (2016) and Liefooghe’s (2016) versions of joint task switching in which two actors 
performed different tasks, with a central task cue and a simpler display than those used by 
Page 6 of 29
































































Joint Task Switching 7
Liefooghe. Each trial started with the task cue (“COLOUR” or “SHAPE) centrally presented 
on the display, which indicated one of the two tasks. In the joint condition, the actor to whom 
the cued task was assigned responded to the target on that trial while the other actor withheld 
responding. The solo condition was essentially identical with the joint condition except that 
only one actor responded when the assigned task was cued while no one responded when the 
co-actor’s task was cued. To obtain clear evidence for co-representation, we should obtain 
not only (1) significant TSCs in the joint condition but also (2) no TSCs in the solo condition, 
because the lack of significant TSCs in the solo condition would allow one to assert the 




Seventy-six undergraduate students at Edge Hill University participated in the present 
experiment as part of seminar in an introductory psychology module. One pair was discarded 
as one of the actors used wrong response keys throughout the joint task, which resulted in 
unusually low accuracy. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 74 participants (67 females; 
mean age=18.95, SD=2.93, range=18-42). All participants reported having normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision, and they received experimental 
credits toward their module or paid £4 for participation. Participants were naïve as to the 
purpose of the experiment. All participants were provided with a participant information 
sheet at the beginning of the seminar, which described the nature of the task and the 
conditions of participation, and signed a consent form if they agreed to participate. The 
research protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Psychology 
Department at Edge Hill University. 
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Joint Task Switching 8
Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus consisted of a 23-in flat screen monitor and a personal computer with a 
desk-top QWERTY keyboard. The target stimuli were colored shapes, green and red squares 
(4.8 cm in sides) and green and red diamonds (squares tilted 45°), and the task cues were the 
words “COLOUR” and “SHAPE” in 40-pt Arial font printed in black against a white 
background. Both stimuli appeared at the screen center.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in one afternoon. Participants were divided into four 
groups of 14-22 participants each. Two groups were run in parallel in two computer rooms 
that were located next to each other and had the same, but mirror-reversed, layout. Each room 
contained 24 seats that were arranged in four rows of six computers in each. At most three 
computers were used from each row, so that pairs of participants were seated every other 
computer to keep sufficient distances between pairs. Participants were randomly paired from 
different seminar groups by the experimenter and were instructed to sit in front of the 
computer monitors. Participants being placed on the left side were designated as “Actor A” 
and those being placed on the right side as “Actor B” in the instructions that were presented 
on the computer monitor. 
Participants read the instructions and started the task at their own pace by pressing the 
space bar. Participants were assigned to the color task or the shape task in a random fashion. 
Actor A used the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys as left and right response keys, and Actor B the ‘1’ and ‘3’ 
keys on the numerical keypad. The assignment of response keys to the target values (green 
vs. red for the color task, or square vs. diamond for the shape task) was also randomly 
determined by the computer at the beginning of the session. Participants were also instructed 
not to talk with their partners during the task. One of the experimenters stayed in each room 
throughout the session.
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Joint Task Switching 9
Each pair performed two phases of the experiment, solo task and joint task. In the 
solo-task phase, only one actor from the pair performed the task and the other actor sat 
quietly. After the first actor, the second actor performed the task alone in a similar manner. 
Each actor started with a block of eight practice trials, followed by two blocks of 96 test 
trials. In the joint-task phase, two actors performed the task together. This phase also started 
with a block of 8 practice trials, followed by two blocks of 96 test trials. Half of the trials in 
each block were the color task and the other half were the shape task, and they occurred in a 
random order. 
Each trial started with the task cue that appeared in the screen center for 750 ms. The 
target replaced the task cue and remained on the screen for 1500 ms or until a response key 
was pressed. When the response was correct, the message “Good” replaced the target; when 
the response was incorrect, the message “Error” occurred at the same position; and when 
there was no response, the message “Faster!” occurred, except when no response was 
required (i.e., nogo trials) in which case the message was “Good.” If a response was made on 
nogo trials, the message was “Do not respond!” When a wrong actor pressed a key, the 
message was “Not your turn!” Response time (RT) was the interval between target onset and 
pression of a response key. A session took less than 30 minutes. 
Note that the sequence of the two tasks varied randomly. Accordingly, about half of 
the trials were repeat trials for which the task was the same as that on the preceding trial, so 
that the actor performing the trial was also the same as the one on the preceding trial. The 
other half were switch trials for which the task was different from that on the preceding trial, 
so that the actor performing the trial was also different from the one on the preceding trial. 
Therefore, task switching and actor switching were confounded in this procedure, like in 
Dudarev and Hassin’s (2016) and Liefooghe’s (2016) studies.  At the same time, switch trials 
were always trials that followed a nogo trial, whereas repeat trials were always trials that 
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Joint Task Switching 10
followed a go trial, so that task/actor switching was also confounded by the type of preceding 
trial (go vs. nogo). 
Results and Discussion
Mean RT for correct go trials and percentages of error trials (PE) were computed for 
each actor. Trials were considered an error if a wrong key was pressed or no response was 
made. Trials were discarded if RT was less than 200 ms, no response was made, or a wrong 
actor responded (1.52%). RT and PE were submitted to a 2 (Block: solo task vs. joint task) x 
2 (Transition: repeat vs. switch) ANOVA (see Table 1), with both factors being within-
subject variables. RT and PE are summarized in Figure 1. 
For RT, main effects of Block and Transition were significant; responses were faster 
for the joint-task block (M=434 ms) than for the solo-task block (M=506 ms), and responses 
were faster for repeat trials (M=473 ms) than for switch trials (M=507 ms), yielding a 34-ms 
TSC. These factors interacted; TSCs were 41 ms for the solo-task block, and 26 ms for the 
joint-task block. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that both TSCs were significant (p<.001)1. 
For PE, the only significant effect was a main effect of Transition; responses were more 
accurate for repeat trials (M=2.26%) than for switch trials (M=4.35%). The same Block-by-
Transition interaction was obtained when using Dudarev and Hassin’s (2016) inverse 
efficiency scores, or IE=RT/(1–PE/100), F(1,73)=7.87, MSE=1035.35, p<.006, ηp2=.097—
again, TSCs were numerically larger for the solo-task block (M=56 ms) than for the joint-task 
block (M=38 ms).
1 We also analyzed the same data including Block Order (solo-task block first vs. joint-task block first) as a 
between-subject variable. The block order was determined randomly, and 24 pairs started with the solo-task 
block and 13 started with the joint-task block. The only interaction involving Block Order was that with Block, 
F(1,72)=5.51, MSE=2246.15, p=.022, ηp2=.071, for RT and, F(1,72)=5.51, MSE=8.93, p<.001, ηp2=.258, for PE. 
This indicated that responses were slower and less accurate for the task block that was performed first than the 
task block that was performed later. No other interactions were significant, suggesting that switch costs did not 
depend on the task order.
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Joint Task Switching 11
To summarize, our results replicated Dudarev and Hassin’s (2016) and Liefooghe’s 
(2016) findings of significant TSCs in the joint block. However, in contrast to these previous 
studies, we also found significant, and even larger TSCs in the solo-task block. The results 
suggest that the presence of an actively involved co-actor is not a necessary condition to 
obtain TSCs in the current task switching procedure. These outcomes provide little support 
for the idea of task- or actor-co-representation, because TSCs were not unique to the joint-
task block. The conclusion corroborates those of our previous studies using different task 
switching procedures where two actors performed the same set of two tasks (Yamaguchi et 
al., 2017b), which also showed little differences between the joint and solo blocks. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Before further evaluating the outcome of Experiment 1 in light of our hypotheses, we 
aimed to test the possible role of some methodological differences between our first 
experiment and the two previous studies on joint task switching (Dudarev & Hassin, 2016; 
Liefooghe, 2016). Participants in the present Experiment 1 performed both the solo and joint 
conditions, whereas participants in the previous studies performed only one of these 
conditions. Accordingly, TSCs might have been obtained in the solo condition of Experiment 
1 because at least some participants had already performed the joint-task block before the 
solo-task block, which might have introduced transfer effects, so that participants performed 
the solo-task block as if they were performing the joint-task block (see Ansorge & Wühr, 
2009, for similar transfer effects between a choice-reaction task to a go/nogo task). While the 
analysis of order effects did not support this possibility (see footnote 1), null-effects of ad-
hoc analyses do not provide the strongest evidence. It may be that merely being exposed to 
particular stimulus-response mappings during the instructions was sufficient to produce 
TSCs—perhaps because actors read the instructions for their co-actor as if they were 
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Joint Task Switching 12
instructions for their own (which could have led to instruction-based automaticity, see 
Liefooghe, Wenke, & De Houwer, 2012). 
It should also be noted that participants in Experiment 1 performed the solo-task 
block in the presence of a co-actor who quietly sat on the next seat. Previous studies have 
shown that a mere presence of an inactive co-actor does not produce the joint Simon effect 
(e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003; Yamaguchi et al., 2018), but others also showed that the presence 
of a salient non-human object next to the participants could serve as a spatial reference and 
produce the joint Simon effect (Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, et al., 2014). Although a salient 
spatial reference is irrelevant to TSC, it is still possible that TSC in the solo condition were 
due to the presence of an inactive co-actor. This issue was also addressed in the present 
experiment.
In Experiment 2, participants performed the tasks alone. They were informed at the 
beginning of a session that there would be two different tasks, but they were not informed of 
the stimulus-response mappings for the second task before completing the first task. If 
instructing particular S-R mappings was responsible for TSCs in the solo condition, we 
should find TSCs in the second-performed task only, but not in the first-performed task.
Method
Participants
Twenty-nine participants (25 females, 4 males; mean age=23.24, SD=5.71, range=18-
42) were newly recruited from the Edge Hill University community. They received a £5 
Amazon Voucher for participation. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal visual 
acuity and normal color vision.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1, but the experiment was 
conducted individually in a cubicle. Participants performed the solo go/nogo task of 
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Joint Task Switching 13
Experiment 1 in the first phase and the full task in the second phase, where they performed 
both of the two tasks and responded on every trial. In the solo go/nogo phase, participants 
were assigned either the color or shape task and responded on trials only when the task cue 
indicated the assigned task and withheld responding when the other task was cued. There was 
one block of 8 practice trials, followed by two blocks of 96 test trials, as in Experiment 1. 
Then, the same participants switched the tasks, so that they responded on trials only when the 
task cue indicated the previously ignored task and withheld responding when the previously 
assigned task was cued. Again, there was a block of 8 practice trials, followed by 96 test 
trials. In the full-task phase, participants responded on all trials. It started with a block of 8 
practice trials, followed by two test blocks of 96 trials. 
Participants used the ‘z’ and ‘c’ keys for one task and the ‘1’ and ‘3’ keys on the 
numeric pad for the other task. In the solo go/nogo phase, they used the left and right index 
fingers of one hand to press the two keys (‘z’ and ‘c’, or ‘1’ and ‘3’). In the full-task phase, 
they used their index and middle fingers of the left hand to press ‘z’ and ‘c’, and the index 
and middle fingers of the right hand to press ‘1’ and ‘3’. The assignments of the keys to the 
two shapes and colors, and to the two tasks, were randomly determined for each participant.  
Participants were informed of the specific stimulus-response mappings for a given task 
only before they performed a block of trials for that task. Thus, those who started with the 
colour task did not know the stimulus-response mappings for the shape task until they 
completed the colour task of the solo go/nogo phase, and those who started with the shape 
task did not know the stimulus-response mappings for the colour task until they completed 
the shape task in the solo go/nogo phase. The procedure was as in Experiment 1 in all other 
respects. 
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Joint Task Switching 14
Results and Discussion
Trials were filtered and mean RT and PE were computed in the same manner as in 
Experiment 1 (4.36% were discarded), and submitted to 3 (Block: first go/nogo vs. second 
go/nogo vs. full task) x 2 (Transition: repeat vs. switch) ANOVAs, with both factors being 
within-subject variables (see Table 1, Figure 2). 
For RT, there were main effects of Block and of Transition. Responses were faster for 
the first and second go/nogo blocks (Ms=500 ms and 501 ms, respectively) than for the full-
task block (M=561 ms). Responses were faster for repeat trials (M=492 ms) than for switch 
trials (M=549 ms), yielding TSCs. However, these variables did not interact, indicating that 
TSCs were similar for the three blocks. Importantly, TSCs were 52 ms for the first and 51 ms 
for the second go/nogo blocks. 
For PE, there were also main effects of Block and Transition. Responses were most 
accurate for the second go/nogo task (M=3.19%), intermediate for the first go/nogo block 
(M=5.95%), and least accurate for the full-task block (M=6.60%). Responses were also more 
accurate for repeat trials (M=4.11%) than for switch trials (M=6.38%). The interaction was 
not significant either. TSCs were again similar for the first and second go/nogo blocks 
(Ms=1.85% and 1.74% for the first and second blocks, respectively).
Both RT and PE indicated that TSCs are robust in the solo go/nogo conditions, and 
their comparable size in the two blocks suggests that the costs do not depend on whether 
other stimulus-response mappings have been presented to the actors before or whether an 
inactive co-actor was present next to the active actor. 
EXPERIMENT 3
Although participants were only instructed on stimulus-response mappings for one 
task in the first block of trials, the task cues were “COLOUR” and “SHAPE” which explicitly 
denoted the two tasks to be performed. This might have allowed participants to infer the 
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Joint Task Switching 15
second task to come in the later phase of the experiment without being informed of it 
explicitly. If so, TSCs obtained in the first block of Experiment 2 could be due to the 
anticipation of the two different tasks implied by the task cues. To rule out this possibility in 
Experiment 3, we replaced the task cues with arbitrary symbols (“XXXX” and “++++”) and 
assigned them randomly to the colour and shape tasks for each participant. We expected that 
TSCs would be obtained with the arbitrary task cues if merely switching between task cues 
produced the effect (Logan & Bundesen, 2003); however, if participants’ knowledge or 
anticipation of two tasks were responsible for TSCs in Experiment 2, there should be no 
TSCs in the first go/nogo block of the present experiment where participants had not been 
informed of the existence of the second task, but TSCs would emerge in the second go/nogo 
block where participants had been instructed on the second task.
Method
Participants
Although the present experiment was planned as a laboratory experiment, we moved 
it to online data collection due to the ongoing global pandemic outbreak that started early in 
2020. Thirty six participants from the University of Essex community completed the 
experiment, but seven were excluded due to low accuracy or a high portion of missing trials 
(see the Results section). Therefore, the present experiment included 29 participants (24 
females, 5 females; mean age=20.47, SD=3.61, range=18-38) who received experimental 
credits toward their psychology modules. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity and normal color vision. The protocol was approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Essex.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
The experiment was created by using lab.js (https://lab.js.org/), which was embedded 
within a Qualtrics survey (https://www.qualtrics.com/). Participants were not allowed to use 
Page 15 of 29
































































Joint Task Switching 16
tablet PCs or smartphones, as filtered by the survey function. The experiment ran on a 
browser, and it required either Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. To keep the display size 
as consistent across participants as possible, the experiment started with a calibration screen 
in which participants were asked to adjust a rectangle displayed on their computer monitor to 
the size of their credit card. The experimental program can be viewed via the following link 
(https://sleepy-noether-418ecc.netlify.app). 
The experiment followed Experiment 2 closely, with the following changes. First, the 
task cues were replaced with arbitrary strings “++++” and “XXXX”, instead of “COLOUR” 
and “SHAPE” used in Experiment 2.  For half of the participants, ++++ was a go signal that 
required participants to respond to the target, and XXXX was a nogo signal that required 
participants to refrain from responding to the target in the first block of trials; XXXX was a 
go signal and ++++ was a nogo signal in the second block. For the other half, the meanings of 
the two cues were reversed. Second, responses were now made by pressing “a” and “d” for 
one task and “j” and “l” for the other task. This change was necessary because participants 
might not have used a keyboard with a numerical pad. 
Results and Discussion
From the 36 participants who completed the entire session, four participants were 
excluded for the overall response accuracy lower than 70%, and three participants were 
excluded for a high proportion of no response on go trials in the first two blocks (> 45%). For 
the remaining 29 participants, trials were filtered in the same manner as in Experiment 2 
(5.11% of the trials were discarded). Mean RT and PE were submitted to 3 (Block: first 
go/nogo vs. second go/nogo vs. full task) x 2 (Transition: repeat vs. switch) ANOVAs, with 
both factors being within-subject variables (see Table 1, Figure 3). 
For RT, there were main effects of Block and of Transition. Responses were faster for 
the first and second go/nogo blocks (Ms=534 ms and 545 ms, respectively) than for the full-
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Joint Task Switching 17
task block (M=618 ms), and for repeat trials (M=544 ms) than for switch trials (M=587 ms), 
yielding TSCs. These results are consistent with Experiment 2. However, Transition 
interacted with Block: TSC was 11 ms for the first go/nogo block, which was not significant 
(p=.254), but it was 49 ms for the second go/nogo block and 71 ms for the full-task block, 
both of which were significant (ps<.002). 
For PE, there were a main effect of Block, but not of Transition. Responses were most 
accurate for the second go/nogo task (M=4.83%), intermediate for the first go/nogo block 
(M=5.11%), and least accurate for the full-task block (M=8.16%), as found in Experiment 2. 
Although the overall TSC was .70% for the first go/nogo block, –0.61% for the second 
go/nogo block, and 4.11% for the full-task block; the effect was significant only for the full-
task block (p<.001). 
For both RT and PE, the results differed from those of Experiment 2: In contrast to 
Experiment 2, TSC in Experiment 3 was not significant in the first go/nogo block for both RT 
and PE. This outcome is consistent with the possibility that, in Experiment 2, participants 
inferred and anticipated the second of the two tasks from the explicit task cues in the first 
block already, even though they were not yet instructed on it, whereas participants in 
Experiment 3 could not, and indeed did not. Taken together, these results imply that merely 
knowing the existence of two different tasks (assigned to two different task cues) can be 
sufficient to obtain TSCs even without a co-actor performing the second task. This finding 
has important implications for the interpretation of TSC in joint task settings. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Two major variations of joint task switching have been used in previous studies that 
drew different conclusions as to whether co-acting individuals shared the same task-sets. Our 
own previous studies tested a condition in which two actors performed the same set of two 
tasks, which provided no evidence supporting shared task-sets between co-actors (Yamaguchi 
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Joint Task Switching 18
et al., 2017b, 2019). Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016) tested a condition in 
which two actors performed different tasks, and this procedure yielded costs of switching 
tasks in a joint-task setting but not in a solo-task setting. Dudarev and Hassin concluded that 
co-actors shared task-sets, although Liefooghe appeared more skeptical. If the former authors 
are correct and TSC in a joint task switching truly reflects shared task-sets between co-actors, 
the procedure would provide an important tool to investigate the nature of task sharing. 
Therefore, the present study aimed at replicating the findings from these two reports and 
further explored the source of TSC in joint task switching. 
The main source of the discrepancies came from the observations of Dudarev and 
Hassin and of Liefooghe that TSCs were obtained in their joint condition but not in the solo 
condition. We thus attempted to replicate these outcomes in Experiment 1 by using a version 
of joint task switching similar to Dudarev and Hassin’s and Liefooghe’s procedures. 
However, in contrast to the previous two studies, we did not obtain any evidence suggesting 
that TSCs may be obtained in the joint, but not in the solo condition—if anything, we found 
that TSCs were larger in the solo condition. On the one hand, our findings thus replicate the 
observations of Dudarev and Hassin (2016) and Liefooghe (2016) that TSCs can be obtained 
under conditions in which the previous task was carried out by another person. On the other 
hand, however, this observation is not sufficient to argue that people perform the other 
person’s task or shared the task-sets, as speculated by Dudarev and Hassin. If actors would 
really mentally perform another person’s task under the conditions being tested here, they 
should exhibit much larger TSCs and should show such effects only in joint, but not in solo 
conditions. 
Experiments 2 and 3 further examined why TSCs might occur in solo conditions. 
Experiment 2 used the same task cues as in Experiment 1, which denoted the two different 
tasks explicitly, and yielded TSC even before participants were instructed on the second of 
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Joint Task Switching 19
the two tasks. Experiment 3 used arbitrary symbols as task cues to conceal the two tasks 
entirely and yielded no TSC before participants were instructed on the second task. These 
results suggest that participants in Experiment 2 spontaneously inferred from the explicit task 
cues that they will be facing two different tasks assigned to the two task cues and actively 
prepared the task that they were not yet supposed to carry out, at least to some degree—a 
process that we successfully prevented in Experiment 3 by using arbitrary task cues that did 
not reveal the nature of the second task. This means that TSC can be obtained as long as 
participants know or infer that two task cues indicate two different tasks, even though they 
are not yet informed about the details of the second task.
Notwithstanding the possibility that would looks like TSCs may actually reflect more 
general switch-unrelated processes (see below), we can imagine at least two scenarios that 
may lead to such spontaneously generated switch costs. First, Cohen-Kdoshay and Meiran 
(2009) have argued that participants can quickly generate task representations that are fully 
operational even before the very first trial of a task. Along these lines, our participants might 
have generated rudimentary representations for the second task even before carrying out the 
first task. While the infrastructure of this task representation could not yet be complete, given 
that the corresponding stimulus-response mappings were not yet instructed, binding the cue 
to this rudimentary task set might have been sufficient for the cue to activate the set, which 
then would conflict with the set for the first task—resulting in TSCs. Second, participants are 
likely to have carried out tasks involving critical stimulus color or shape information before, 
which would imply that they brought stored task sets with shape or color as important 
ingredients or trigger conditions (Schumacher & Hazeltine, 2016; Waszak, Hommel & 
Allport, 2003), so that even the not-yet-instructed task cue would trigger the retrieval of a 
previously acquired task set that that would now compete with the set of the first task—also 
resulting in TSCs.
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Joint Task Switching 20
Both scenarios would explain why Dudarev and Hassin did not find switch costs when 
two actors performed the same task because the task cues in such a condition were not 
associated with different tasks. At the same time, it is curious that the same authors failed to 
find any TSCs in their solo condition because their participants had received practice on both 
tasks prior to the first test block, regardless of whether they were assigned to the solo or joint 
condition. As Liefooghe suggested, some design features may have an impact on the degree 
to which a present co-actor attract attention to a degree that impairs the actor’s efficiency to 
retrieve task-rules and to discriminate between the two actors in switch trials. For instance, 
the use of arbitrary task cues would make it easier to ignore the task that is not being 
performed in the given block, which may explain the lack of TSC in the solo condition of 
Dudarev and Hassin’s, who used arbitrary shapes as task cues. Also, switch trials have been 
found to render the cognitive system particularly vulnerable to the impact of irrelevant 
information (Waszak et al., 2003), so that the possible attention-distracting impact of a 
present co-actor may affect switch trials more than repeat trials (Dreisbach, 2012). If so, the 
differences we obtained between switch and repeat trials may not reflect true TSCs but, 
rather, the greater sensitivity of cognitive-control processes to irrelevant information in 
switch trials as compared to repeat trials. 
Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier, it is important to keep in mind that there are at 
least two confounding factors in TSCs in the current procedure. First, task switching also 
required actor switching as two tasks were assigned to different actors. Second, task/actor 
switching was also confounded by the type of the preceding trial, as switch trials were trials 
that followed a nogo trial while repeat trials were trials that followed a go trial. Previous 
studies have indicated some evidence that RT tends to be longer after nogo trials than after go 
trials, regardless of task/actor switching (e.g., Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2003; Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens, & McLaren, 2016). 
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Joint Task Switching 21
What looks like TSCs in the present study may thus actually reflect general slowing after 
nogo trials or priming after go trials.
This explanation would also reconcile our findings with many previous studies using a 
go/nogo signal in a ‘solo’ task switching procedure, in which TSCs were not obtained after a 
nogo trial in a ‘solo’ task-switching procedure (e.g., Lenartowiez et al., 2011; Schuch & 
Koch, 2003; Verbruggen et al., 2005). The lack of TSCs after a nogo trial is often taken as 
evidence suggesting that TSCs are generated by response selection: True TSCs may still 
require previous response selection under another task set, and thus may not occur after nogo 
trials. Therefore, there are good reasons to suspect that TSCs in the current version of joint 
task switching originated from processes other than those that generate true TSCs. In any 
case, it is clear that the present results provide little evidence for shared task-sets in joint task 
switching, and further investigations are needed to separate true from apparent TCS and to 
explore the possibility of the spontaneous creation and/or retrieval of task sets.
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FIGURE CAPTIONS
Figure 1. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo and joint 
tasks of Experiment 1.
Figure 2. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo go/nogo task 
and the full task of Experiment 2.
Figure 3. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo go/nogo task 
and the full task of Experiment 3.
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Figure 1. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo and joint 
tasks of Experiment 1.
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Figure 2. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo go/nogo task 
and the full task of Experiment 2.
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Figure 3. Response times (RT; A) and percentages of errors (PE; B) for the solo go/nogo task 
and the full task of Experiment 3.
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Joint Task Switching 1
Table 1. ANOVA results of Experiments 1-3.
Factors  df MSE F p ηp2
Experiment 1: Response Time
Block 1,73 2,384.95 33.16 < .001 .312
Transition 1,73 1,159.27 71.49 < .001 .495
Block x Transition  1,73 372.25 10.82 .002 .129
Experiment 1: Percentage of Errors
Block 1,73 11.87 < 1 .963 < .001
Transition 1,73 13.43 24.01 < .001 .248
Block x Transition  1,73 10.19 1.01 .317 .014
Experiment 2: Response Time
Block 2,56 5,287.31 13.37 < .001 .323
Transition 2,56 2,720.17 52.02 < .001 .650
Block x Transition  2,56 1,405.46 < 1 .389 .033
Experiment 2: Percentage of Errors
Block 2,56 40.87 4.65 .014 .142
Transition 2,56 9.71 22.98 < .001 .451
Block x Transition  2,56 6.87 1.40 .254 .048
Experiment 3: Response Time
Block 2,56 6,766.95 17.81 < .001 .389
Transition 2,56 1,977.41 41.86 < .001 .599
Block x Transition  2,56 1,949.31 6.87 .002 .197
Experiment 3: Percentage of Errors
Block 2,56 51.56 3.85 .027 .121
Transition 2,56 29.52 2.88 .101 .093
Block x Transition  2,56 25.04 3.43 .039 .109
Note: Bold indicates statistical significance at α = .05.
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